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Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany both desired to create a new generation in order to bring
about a society different than the latent liberal one of the nineteenth century.1 Youth were a
cornerstone of the creation of a new national community and thus the implementation of this
ideal.2 However, both Italy and Germany came into conflict with the Catholic Church over this
issue. For the Church, youth education was a way to form the next generation of Catholics and
ensure the future of its teachings.3 It was also key in fulfilling the Church’s goal of creating a
Christian society.4 The ways in which each entity sought to cultivate youth was differentiated by
gender. However, both the Church and the fascist states were interested in cultivating youth as a
whole. Essentially, the conflict between the Catholic Church and the fascist states over youth
was a battle to fulfill different ideologies and shape the people of a nation.
Nevertheless, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were countries with different relations
with the Catholic Church. Thus, it is necessary to recognize that, in both states, the drive to
control youth operated within a complex relationship between Church and state. Furthermore, the
specific role of the Catholic Church in Italy and Germany resulted in a distinctive context for the
conflict over youth in each country. It is therefore essential to address the unique characteristics
of the Catholic experience in both countries as well as the place of Protestantism in Germany.
The conflict over youth resulted from the same basic principle, in that both the fascist states and
the Church had their own vision for the future and attempted to fulfill those visions by capturing
the consciences of youth. However, the progression and outcome of this battle in each country
was different due to historical and cultural disparities. Nevertheless, in both states the extent of
the Church’s right to educate and shape youth was a contentious issue during the period of fascist
rule.5 While the fascist states engineered their new generation, the Church worked to preserve
certain rights in order to maintain its traditional power structures as well as its influence on the
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young.6 This tension was directly addressed through agreements between both states and the
Vatican and through later exchanges on the meaning of these agreements. State action that
attempted to limit the Church’s rights and the consequent opposition by the Church to these
actions further complicated the issue of youth. Ultimately, the battle between the fascist states
and the Catholic Church over youth, while diverging in its specific context and outcome in each
state, demonstrated the resilience of the Church in retaining aspects of its traditional power and
worldview in the face of fascist efforts to remake society.
Essential to understanding the context of the conflict between Church and state during the
fascist regimes is knowledge of the place of the Catholic Church in both countries. Italy was a
majority Catholic nation and the Catholic Church had historically made its home territory within
the Italian heartland. This meant that the influence of the Church on Italian life was immense,
especially when compared to countries at a further geographic distance. The closeness in
proximity of the Italian dioceses to Rome gave Church hierarchy a powerful influence on Italian
society. Since Rome was the heart of Catholicism, the Church had a justification to claim moral
authority over Italy and thus penetrate its social fabric.7 The greatest support for the Church’s
authority was from the rural Italian peasantry. Those who ruled in Italy prior to the
Risorgimento, or its unification into one state, often found it difficult to influence this group.
Thus, the Church’s power preceding Italian unification rivaled that of the state in many cases.
The Church’s popular success was due in large part to its interest in welfare through actions such
as caring for the sick and destitute. However, it also catered to the powerful, as an alliance with
the Church was often a status symbol for the elite in Italian society.8 Prior to the Risorgimento
the Church had claimed Rome and a large part of the Italian mainland as the heart of its
international empire.9 However, with the unification of Italy in the mid to late nineteenth
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century, the Papal States disintegrated and Pope Pius IX gave the Italian government no
recognition by Catholics or the Church. This created a long-lasting divide between Italy and the
Catholic Church, often called the Roman Question.10 However, despite its loss of land, the
Catholic Church in Italy was still a deeply influential force. It was national in scope and
influenced Italian society through the promotion of ideas about morality and the formation of a
popular culture and thus entrenched itself into the social fabric of the country.11
Unlike Italy, Catholicism in Germany was a religious minority. During the late nineteenth
century Catholics were only around forty percent of the German population, the rest of which
was heavily Protestant.12 Thus, when considering religion in Germany it becomes necessary to
address Protestantism. While the Protestant churches in Germany did find some of the state’s
youth policies concerning, overall the conflict between Nazi Germany and Protestantism over
youth was not as ideologically motivated as the conflict with the Catholic Church. In fact,
Protestant social and ethical theory was more closely aligned with the values of Nazism than
Catholicism was.13 For example, Protestantism rejected clerical authority, accepted nondenominational schools as a way to disrupt Catholic influence, and had a history of nationalist
rhetoric. All of these attributes aligned more with Nazi values than Catholicism did.14 Moreover,
Protestant youth groups were smaller in size and less centralized than Catholic ones, and in part
due to their similarities in social theory, were incorporated into the Nazi youth organization
earlier.15 While by 1933 a majority of German Protestants were represented by the German
Evangelical Church, Protestantism in Germany was still less centralized than Catholicism. There
were sects within the religion that represented different beliefs than the German Evangelical
Church. This diffused the extent of Protestantism’s organizational influence. While there was
some conflict over the issue of youth between Protestants and the state, it was not on a
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widespread organizational level like the conflict with the Catholic Church.16 Thus, the
relationship with Protestantism over youth was not an institutionalized power struggle for
influence in the same way the conflict with the Catholic Church was. Within the inherent power
struggle between religious youth groups and the Nazis, the Catholic Church rose as the most
prominent and centralized threat in Germany. It was the Catholic Church that was uneasily
incorporated into the Nazi milieu, and it was therefore the Church that harbored the greatest
threat to the Nazis’ fulfillment of a new generation and national community. Consequently, it is
the Catholic Church and its conflict with Nazi Germany over youth that is the focus of this
argument.
In contrast to Italy, the Catholic Church in Germany was more regional.17 However,
despite its minority status, the Church was influential and well organized. Of the forty-million
Protestants in the country there were only sixteen-thousand pastors, whereas of the twentymillion Catholics in Germany, there were twenty-thousand priests.18 Thus, the influence of the
Church on the country and its followers was significant. This impact, and the Catholic Church’s
interest in society, was in response to a history of persecution by the German state in the
nineteenth century known as the Kulturkampf, or cultural struggle.19 At the beginning of the
1870s, Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire, took measures to limit Catholic
political participation and social influence. These included decrees in 1871 and 1872 that limited
the right of clergymen to comment in public assemblies and weakened clerical influence in
schools.20 The Church survived these policies and resolved to increase its social influence and
thus protect the rights of Catholics.21 The ability of the Church to endure through a tense political
situation and continue to influence German society signaled a history of resilience by the
Catholic Church in Germany.
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The Church also influenced each country through participation in politics. The place of
the Catholic Church in politics prior to the rise of the fascist states was important to the eventual
relationship between Church and state under fascism. This was because the relationship in both
states during the fascist period was conditioned around the political participation of Catholicism,
specifically regarding lay organizations, which included youth groups. The historical context of
this tension was derived from the pre-fascist years when largely successful and influential
Catholic political parties developed in both Italy and Germany.
In Italy, the Italian Popular Party (Partido Popolare Italiano) was prominent in the
country and it eventually became the second largest political party in the nation, after the Italian
Socialist Party.22 The electoral base of the Party came largely from Catholic associations, with
the social class of their supporters being middle class bourgeoisie. The social class of the Popular
Party’s base made it a significant competitor against the Italian Fascists as they applied to earn
the favor of the same group of voters.23 The competition between the two entities made the
Fascist Party wary of the Catholic associations that gave the Party its strength. Suspicion of
Catholic lay activity, including youth groups, became evident in subsequent conflicts over youth
between the Church and the Fascist Party during Mussolini’s rule.
In Germany, the Centre Party was the Catholic political party of prominence.24 It was
committed to protecting Catholic interests in the country and derived its power largely from the
loyalty of a strong Catholic base.25 The Centre Party had a diverse platform, including both a
left-liberal and right-nationalist wing. However, it was largely a party with a center based
ideology.26 Moreover, the Centre Party was a cornerstone of the political structure of the Weimar
Republic and an important force in politically stabilizing the state.27 It was part of every Weimar
government, even after being overtaken in 1912 by the Social Democratic Party as the largest
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party in the German parliament, or Reichstag.28 This prominence of the Centre Party in German
politics made Catholicism a powerful force in Germany.29 However, the rise of the Nazi Party
destabilized the Weimar Republic. The relationship between the Centre Party and the Nazis was
one of hostility. The Centre saw the Nazis as irrational and violent while the Nazis believed the
Centre Party to be an example of the problems of the Weimar Republic.30 This conflict bred
tension and suspicion between the two parties. Therefore, in Germany, as in Italy, the historic
power and influence of Catholic political participation laid the fodder for distrust and conflict
between Church and state under fascist rule.
The political participation of the Catholic Church in Italy and Germany also revolved
around the shaping of youth. The recognition of youth as a distinct group developed during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and came into its own after World War I.31 Youth
movements prior to and after World War I wanted to revolutionize society and create a new era.
These youth believed themselves to be new men compared to their predecessors’ generation.32 In
Germany, the youth movement was more developed than in Italy and found expression through
multiple confessional youth groups such as Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups, as well as
secular groups such as the naturalist group, the Birds of Passage (Wandervögel).33 Indeed,
Germany had the greatest amount of autonomous youth associations of any country in the
world.34 However, after World War I youth groups became politicized as political parties
recognized their usefulness and created youth groups of their own.35 For example, the Centre
Party was seen as the political home of Catholic youth groups despite Catholic youth themselves
not being political.36 The ramifications of Catholic political involvement with youth set the
groundwork for later Church-state conflict.
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Moreover, in Italy, there was widespread discontentment with the old world and a desire
for a revolt of the young against the past of their forefathers.37 The idea of youth as a distinct
group had been popular in Italy since its unification into one state.38 However, the movement of
the young in Italy had more of a political basis and was less of a widespread group movement
than in Germany. In Italy, the young developed into an anti-liberal, anti-socialist generation prior
to World War I and expressed themselves through groups such as the Futurists and Nationalist
Riviste Fiorentine journalists.39 Consequently, by the period of fascist rule in both Italy and
Germany, there was a recognition of youth as a valuable, separate part of society that both the
Catholic Church and the state was able to take advantage of.
The fascist states of Italy and Germany came into power with different yet similar social
conditions surrounding them. The tenets of fascism attempted to make sense of these social
conditions and craft them into a workable ideology. However, the Catholic Church also had its
own ideological goals. The tension between these two ideologies was fundamental to the conflict
over youth during fascist rule. For both fascist regimes the community reigned supreme over the
individual.40 For example, for the Nazis the goal of their regime was to shape individuals into the
bearers of a new community. In this way, the community usurped the individual.41 The surrender
of the individual to national interest was also seen in Italy. In a 1925 speech, Giovanni Gentile, a
fascist philosopher, spoke regarding the idea that Italian Fascism brought the public and private
self into one.42 There was no individual self that was not tied to the national interest.
The importance of community building to both the Italian Fascists and the German Nazis
was expressed through the ideal of the new man. There are many ways in which to interpret the
new man ideal, but the approach most relevant to this argument is the concept first provided by
historians such as George L. Mosse in the mid to late twentieth century. Mosse developed the
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idea of fascism as a cultural movement.43 Specifically, Mosse argues that fascism was a revolt
against the liberal culture that pervaded Europe at the time. Mosse also argues that fascism was a
movement of youth and that youth were to provide fodder for the creation of a new man, and
thus a new generation, that was not scarred and diminished by the past.44 This new generation
was to establish a movement toward something new, or rather, a new society.45 Historian Jorge
Dagnino, in his article “The Myth of the New Man in Italian Fascist Ideology,” writes
specifically of the Italian new man ideal when he says that the new man was one that sacrificed
the self to the collective and was a different type of human being for the new age to come.46
Thus, the new man ideal was a tool for the fascist states to implement their vision. Nazi Party
insider Hermann Rauschning writes of Hitler’s beliefs on the ideal of the new man in the
following quote ascribed to Hitler, “In my great educative work...I am beginning with the young.
We older ones are used up...But my magnificent youngsters! Are there finer ones anywhere in
the world?...With them I can make a new world.”47 For the Nazi leader, youth became a rallying
point due to the potential for a new society they represented. This new society was to be one of a
national community rather than the liberalized and ineffective ideal of the individual. For both
states influence over youth was a way to fulfill this goal.
However, the fulfillment of the ideal of a new national community was not without its
obstacles. While fascism wanted to create a new society, the Catholic Church had its own view
of the future. Catholicism also idealized the idea of community. A Catholic was a Catholic inside
and out in the same way that fascism was meant to pervade the individual.48 While the goals of
the Church were not as revolutionary as those of the fascists in that they did not want to create a
completely new society, the aims of the Church did directly conflict with those of the regimes.
According to historian Emma Fattorini in her book Hitler, Mussolini, and the Vatican: Pope Pius
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XI and the Speech that Was Never Made, “...fascism sought to employ Catholic universalism to
strengthen its nationalism, while the Church hoped to use the authoritarianism of the regime to
erect a Catholic state.”49 Thus, the Church desired to implant its influence in states and was
specifically interested in Italy due to its social legacy in the country. The Church saw a more
authoritative state, such as a fascist one, as a positive ally in its goal to create Catholic states and
re-Christianize society. An authoritative state already had the hallmarks of a force that had the
potential to help Catholicism penetrate society, however, the Church never desired to be
subordinate to such a force.50 Therefore, the Church was interested in sustaining power and using
it to advance its worldview and this placed it in competition with fascism over the fulfillment of
ideological goals.
While both the fascist states and the Church had objectives they wanted to fulfill, they
needed a vessel in which to do so. For both entities youth was that vessel, a condition which laid
the groundwork for dispute. For the fascists, youth were essential to the longevity and viability
of the fascist message and the development of a fascist future. Education of youth allowed the
states to develop a sense of uniformity in their populace, a condition that facilitated the creation
of the new generation that was needed to remake society.51 In both Italy and Germany the fascist
parties, prior to taking power, had recognized the potential of youth and established their own
youth groups within their movements. In Germany, the first Nazi youth group was established in
1922 and called the Youth League of the NSDAP (Jugendbund der NSDAP). It was a way for the
Party to lay claim to youth who were too young to be full-fledged members of the Nazi Party and
at the same time instill in them a recognition of their importance in bringing about the new era
the movement promised.52 In Italy, disillusioned university youth were a strength of the Fascist
movement. Fascist groups like the Fascist University Groups (Gruppi Universitari Fascisti) and
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Fascist Youth Avant-garde (Avanguardie Giovanili Fasciste) were dependent on the Fascist
Party.53 When both movements came to power in their respective states (Mussolini became
prime minister in 1922 and Hitler was named Reich Chancellor in 1933) their youth groups
morphed into ones of national scope.54 Germany had the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend) for boys
and the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel) for young women.55 Similarly, Italy
had the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB) which was comprised of both boys and girls groups.56
While young men and women were essential to the fulfillment of a new generation, they
each had different roles to play in doing so. Girls were taught the basics of first aid, childcare,
and housework. As mothers-to-be, they were essential to the future of both nations. Their
education in childcare and household duties became necessary to ensure they would raise
children that would carry on the ideals of the regime and thus maintain a new generation. On the
other hand, boys’ groups were focused on physicality in sports and the military. They were the
bearers of a militaristic dynamism that would work to secure a new society.57 Thus, the ways in
which the regimes sought to cultivate a new generation was differentiated by gender. These
differences in education were hallmarks of the place each gender was to play in the fulfillment of
the new society. Nonetheless, capturing the consciences of youth in general was important to
both fascist states. Recognizing the potential of youth, the fascist parties, prior to and during their
reign, sought to control youth and thus realize their ideals.
Additionally, the Catholic Church’s desire for influence over youth sprang from the same
inclination for control that was part of fascist ideology. The Church desired to influence both
boys and girls and thus develop strong Catholic citizens. However, the hierarchy of the Church
was specifically interested in young women as they felt that modern society affected them in
ways more overtly impactful than it did young men.58 Nevertheless, for the Church, like the

11
fascists, youth education was a way to form the next generation of Catholics and thus ensure the
future of the Church’s teachings.59 This desire for control was seen in the international umbrella
organization for Catholic lay activity, including youth groups, called Catholic Action (Azione
Cattolica). It was created by Pius X in 1905 as a framework for Catholic lay activity.60 This
framework was most powerful in Italy, where it was first established. However, it also had
branches internationally, including one in Germany.61 After reforms in 1923, Catholic Action
became more dependent on Church hierarchy, with a national director appointed by the Pope.62
This marked its importance to the Church’s future vision. However, the Catholic Action model
was not as popular in Germany as in its place of birth, although it still existed. Instead, German
Catholic youth groups were largely nationwide in scope and independent of Vatican control.63
While Catholic youth were unified under the umbrella organization Catholic Youth of Germany
in 1928, they were still less centralized than the youth groups of Italy that were dependent on the
Catholic Action model. Catholic Youth of Germany was comprised of more than twenty leagues,
congregations, and associations of different sizes across Germany.64 These leagues included the
Youth Federation of New Germany (Jugendbund Neudeutschland) and the Stormtroopers
(Sturmschar). The largest of the German Catholic youth groups was the Catholic Young Men’s
Association (Jungmannerverband, JMV).65 This group was essential to the Nazi conflict with the
Church over youth and the consequent repression of Catholic youth groups. German Catholic
youth and the organization of Catholic Action embodied the Church’s international push to
influence Catholic citizens of many countries. The Church saw youth education as essential to its
future, specifically as a means to facilitate the re-Christianization of society, and thus the
Church’s penetration into the social fabric of the European states.66
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The conflict over youth organizations between the fascist states and the Catholic Church
became evident during and after the signing of the Lateran Treaties with Italy in 1929 and the
Reich Concordat with Germany in 1933. The process of negotiating these treaties, and the tense
atmosphere of the years after these agreements up until wartime, illustrated the Church’s deep
interest in youth education and resilient desire to preserve its worldview and rights in
competition with the fascist states. However, while the conflicts mirrored each other in their
basic structure, the cultural and social conditions of both countries made the progression and
results of the conflict distinct to each state. The place of the Catholic Church was different in
Germany than it was in Italy during the period of fascist rule. In Germany, the Church, while
influential, was not an essential part of German society. The Nazis ultimately saw Christianity,
including the Catholic Church, as something that would be superseded by Nazi ideology.67 In
Italy, the Church was ingrained in the state, and this was made blatant when it became the
country’s state religion. This influence was also seen in the power retained by Catholic Action in
the country following the Lateran Treaties. With the Catholic Church in Germany a minority and
not influential across German society, Hitler and the Nazis were able to craft a stronger policy
against the Church than that which appeared in Italy. Thus, the struggle in Germany between
Church and state resulted in greater direct coercive policies than the conflict present in Italy.
Nevertheless, in both states, the response of the Church to the issue of youth education revealed a
significant struggle between Church and state.
During the early days of the Fascist regime in Italy, Fascist youth competed with other
ideological youth groups such as those of the Catholics, liberals, and nationalists. In order to
fulfill its goal to create a new Fascist generation, Mussolini’s regime recognized the need for a
monopoly over of youth in Italy. This began when the Italian Parliament approved the
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establishment of the Fascist mass youth organization, the Opera Nazionale Balilla, on April 3,
1926.68 The establishment of the ONB signified the movement of the Fascist regime into a
controlling and absolutist state and thus created conflict with Catholic youth groups. This
conflict was a power struggle based in ideology as the monopolistic aims of the ONB threatened
the existence and influence of Catholic youth groups. In particular the organizational plan of the
ONB prohibited any other organization from educating the youth of Italy spiritually, physically,
or morally.69
The progress of the state toward a monopoly over youth came at the same time that
Mussolini, in August 1926, began negotiations with the Catholic Church to answer the Roman
Question.70 A factor that also impacted the negotiation process was the waves of street violence
between Fascist and Catholic youth during the summer and fall of 1926. The violence was a
result of revolutionary factions within the Fascist Party that desired to push Mussolini to enact
their vision. Because many revolutionaries held anti-Catholic views, Church institutions were
targets. A flashpoint of this violence was on October 31, 1926 when, after an attempt on the life
of Mussolini, Fascist groups attacked Catholic institutions and youth groups.71 Disorder, initiated
through violent action, hampered the negotiation process of the Lateran Treaties and went on to
disrupt Church-state relations on multiple occasions. However, it was not solely revolutionaries
who obstructed the negotiation process. Mussolini also played a role when he threatened to
suppress all youth groups under Catholic Action twice during the period of negotiations.72
While the revolutionaries’ violence may not have been directed by Mussolini himself, it
served him in the negotiation process because it forced the Vatican to seek assistance from
Mussolini.73 Ultimately, the violence and intimidation demonstrated the state’s ability to threaten
the autonomy of Church organizations and therefore allowed Mussolini to keep the negotiations
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on a path that pleased his aims. The revelation of the Church’s precarious hold over the Italian
population made clear to Pope Pius XI the need to protect Catholic youth and lay organizations
through an agreement between Church and state.74 However, the Vatican did not desire to
capitulate on the topic of its lay organizations, especially its influence over youth. Pope Pius XI
was a strong proponent of Catholic Action, and on December 20, 1926, in a public formal
meeting of the Cardinals at the Vatican, he spoke out against Mussolini’s threats to Catholic
Action and the controlling and monopolistic concept of the Fascist state. This issue was of such
importance to the Pope that he even went so far as to insinuate that the Lateran Treaties were not
as important as protecting Catholic youth.75
Nevertheless, despite this conflict, an agreement was negotiated between the two powers.
The importance of the moment for both Mussolini’s regime and the Church, in regard to
recognition and legal protection, meant that negotiations sustained despite the tension of the
moment. Thus, on February 11, 1929 the Lateran Treaties were signed between Fascist Italy and
the Catholic Church. As a result, the seventy-year break between the Church and Italy ended.
Additionally, the agreement resulted in gains to both sides. Mussolini’s state received the
Church’s official recognition, while Catholicism became the state religion.76 However, this did
not mean that the issue of youth dissolved or that the relationship between Fascist Italy and the
Catholic Church became completely harmonious. In fact, while the Lateran Treaties did endow
Mussolini’s government with the recognition of the Church, it also enshrined the Church’s
ability to influence Italian youth. Article 43 of the Lateran Treaties’ Concordat of 1929
recognized the right of Catholic lay organizations, including Catholic Action, to activities of a
religious nature under the direction of Church hierarchy as long as they were nonpolitical.77
While this limited Catholic lay activity, it also constructed a future where the Church’s public
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and social influence was enshrined by the state.78 Through the Lateran Treaties, Catholic Action
became the only autonomous organization in Italy that was not Fascist in nature. In fact, Catholic
Action was such a hub of Catholic social influence that it became the political mouthpiece of the
Church during the Fascist regime.79 Therefore, the Church’s resilience in Italy about its lay
activity developed a reality that saw the Church retain key aspects of its power and influence
over youth.
The rise of fascism to power in Germany began when the Nazi movement’s leader, Adolf
Hitler, was named Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933.80 It ended with the passage of the
Enabling Act on March 23, 1933, which gave Hitler the capacity to rule by decree, essentially
suppressing all the political power of the Reichstag.81 The hostility that had been bred between
the Nazi Party and the Centre Party made the Centre a threat to the successful enactment of the
Enabling Act. However, the Centre Party’s main concern was in protecting the rights of the
Church, specifically that of youth education. This reflected the Vatican’s intense interest in
protecting the Church’s traditional rights and areas of power. Thus, the lure of an agreement,
similar to Italy’s 1929 Lateran Treaties, that would provide legal protection to the Church made
the Centre Party willing to cooperate.82 Despite a history of suspicion of the Nazi Party, the
Centre Party was persuaded by Hitler that the Enabling Act would not threaten Church rights.
This, coupled with pressure from the Vatican, led the Centre Party to vote in favor of the
Enabling Act.83 Thus, the Church saw compromising with the Nazi leader as an option that
would allow the institution to stay resilient against Nazi aggression and retain its traditional
rights of influence.
In some ways to adhere to his promise to protect Church rights and in the best interest of
his burgeoning regime, Hitler decided to act with civility toward the Church. His policy was one
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of indirect, rather than blatant, coercion. This decision was influenced by the Church’s strong
international presence that made it politically dangerous to show aggression towards the
institution.84 Hitler’s policies were also influenced by the importance of the Saar vote. After
World War I, the area of the Saarland was governed by the League of Nations and its coal mines
were given to France. However, the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that after fifteen years the
Saarland was allowed to vote on whether the area would be sovereign to France or Germany.
The securement of this area for Germany, and specifically control of its coal mines, was essential
to Hitler.85 However, the area of the Saar was seventy percent Catholic, so a policy that was not
overtly coercive to the Church was necessary.86 This choice of an amicable relationship with the
institution resulted in the start of negotiations for an agreement between Church and state like
that between Mussolini’s regime and the Vatican in 1929.
Similar to Italy, the time of negotiations for an agreement in Germany was coupled with
conflict and mistrust between the Church and the fascist party in power. One of these conflicts
came in the form of the dual loyalties expressed by German Catholics. Unlike in Italy, their
religion was not synonymous with their homeland. This meant that there was a constant battle
among many about of whether they were more Catholic or German. This conflict was recognized
by the Nazis and resulted in the shaming of many in Catholic youth groups by Nazi youth for not
becoming good citizens of the Fatherland and instead favoring their religion too heavily.87
Furthermore, Hitler’s regime applied pressure to Catholic youth through propaganda. This was
combined with reduced financial aid to Catholic associations as well as pressure on teachers and
employers who showed preference to Catholic youth. Tactics such as these harmed the chances
of Catholic youth members for future prosperity within the state.88 The regime also specifically
targeted the Church’s political voice.89 The Centre Party’s identity as a mainstay in the political
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structure of the Weimar Republic was a threat to the Nazi Party. Consequently, Hitler greatly
desired the promise of the exclusion of Catholic priests from political action in any agreement
between Germany and the Vatican.90 But the Nazi leader did not wait until negotiations had
ended before he began to arrest priests active in the Centre Party, and its Bavarian branch, the
Bavarian People's Party, on June 20 through the 23, 1933.91
Nevertheless, despite these realities, negotiations for a Concordat continued. The signing
of an agreement was important to both parties. For Hitler, it meant the legitimization of his
government in foreign eyes and the enshrinement of his power through the elimination of a
political threat from German Catholics. For the Vatican, it meant the protection of its schools and
lay organizations from Nazi control. The negotiations of the Reich Concordat were conducted by
Germany’s Vice Chancellor Franz Von Papen and the Vatican’s Secretary of State Eugenio
Pacelli, with Pope Pius XI keeping a close eye on the proceedings.92 However, with the Church
in Germany more independent of central authority than it was in Italy, regional voices were
important, although not sought during negotiation.93 On May 30, 1933, German bishops met to
discuss a possible Concordat at the Fulda Conference. What came out of this conference was the
Fulda Pastoral, which outlined the opinions of the bishops regarding what should be made clear
in any agreement between Church and state. The bishops demanded freedom for the Church to
continue its youth organizations and confessional schools as well as the protection of its
property. However, they also recognized their faithfulness to the state, by expressing their
demands not in any sentiment against the state, but rather based on their unique Catholic
identity.94 Thus, the demands of the bishops closely aligned to the priorities of the Vatican, those
being interest in protecting the Church’s traditional power to shape a Catholic worldview in its
young followers through an agreement between Church and state.
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Regardless of Catholic hesitancies, the Reich Concordat was signed on July 20, 1933 and
became final on September 10 of that same year.95 Like in Italy, the conflict over youth between
the Church and the Nazis also centered around a specific part of the agreement. Article 31 of the
Reich Concordat addressed the issue of Catholic lay activity, which included Catholic youth
groups. The article limited Catholic lay activity to that which was exclusively religious. This
erased, for Hitler, the potential of Catholic political competition. Additionally, Catholic youth
were promised the ability to perform their Church duties while not being coerced to do anything
irreconcilable with their religious beliefs.96 However, unlike Article 43 of Concordat of 1929,
Article 31 of the Reich Concordat was not clear in what it protected. There was no exact
consensus about which groups were safeguarded and thus the agreement carried less weight. This
meant that the Church’s desire in signing this agreement went unfulfilled. The Church lacked a
clearly defined ability to protect its traditional areas of influence and defend itself against Nazi
aggression.97
Despite the signing of agreements between Church and state in Italy and Germany,
underlying complexities in each state further complicated the conflict over youth. The continued
power of Catholic Action in Italy and the weaknesses of the Reich Concordat in Germany meant
that conflict over the issue of youth continued after the signing of the Lateran Treaties and the
Reich Concordat.
Article 43 of the Concordat of 1929 enshrined Catholic Action and Catholic lay activity’s
social and political influence, albeit restricting it to a nonpolitical role. Recognizing this,
Mussolini wanted to weaken Article 43.98 A series of events during 1930 advanced the notion
that Catholic lay activity was a threat to the regime. After the signing of the Lateran Treaties,
there was a rise in Catholic lay activity and heightened activism by Catholics. This was coupled
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with increased militancy among Catholic university students, the discovery of the anti-Fascist
organization National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), as well as resistance by clergy and local
leaders to Catholic youth belonging to the ONB.99 These events worked together to portray
Catholic lay activity as a threat and were a prelude to conflict in 1931.
In the Spring of 1931, Catholic Action planned to expand its activities by organizing
Catholic university students. This was the perfect opportunity for Mussolini to act against the
threat of Catholic Action. Through the use of propaganda Mussolini disparaged the organization,
specifically connecting it to the now defunct Italian Popular Party. This portrayed Catholic
Action as a political threat to the Fascist regime. In early April 1933, Mussolini banned the
Catholic University Federation in Ferrara and Pavia and investigated Catholic youth activity.
Ultimately, Mussolini demanded that Pope Pius XI acknowledge the nonpolitical nature of
Catholic Action.100 During this time, violence was also visited upon Catholic clubs and their
members.101 Young University Fascists took part in street violence against Catholic youth. On
May 27, 1931, Fascist youth invaded and ransacked Catholic clubs and infiltrated the
headquarters of Catholic organizations. The conflict came to a head when, on May 29, Mussolini
ordered the disbandment of all Catholic youth organizations.102 Through these actions, Mussolini
desired to make it clear to Pope Pius XI that Catholic Action and lay activity should not infiltrate
society in a way that threatened the Fascist regime.103
However, Pius XI had a strong reaction to Fascist violence. On June 29, 1931 the Pope
wrote Non Abbiamo Bisogno, an encyclical that denounced Fascist violence and the state’s desire
for a monopoly over youth. Pius XI wrote that, “a conception of the State, which makes the
young generations belong entirely to it without any exception from the tenderest years up to
adult life, cannot be reconciled by a Catholic with the Catholic doctrine; nor can it be reconciled
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with the natural right of the family.”104 The Pope’s response did not capitulate to Mussolini’s
desire to repress Catholic social influence. Instead, the Pope wanted Mussolini to know the
Church’s strong stance over the issue of youth and lay activity. He wanted to make clear that the
Church would not end its attempts to shape a Catholic worldview in its followers. Nevertheless,
the Pope’s response did not condemn the Fascist Party itself. Rather, it focused on the Party’s
monopolistic tendencies and a desire for the recognition of Church rights.105 The strength of the
Church’s hold on Catholic youth and Mussolini’s desire to weaken other influences on society
was essential to the conflict in 1931. Both sides had a vested interest in the outcome of this
conflict as it sought to determine who held the power to shape youth in the state.
Nevertheless, by the end of July 1931 the Vatican desired to end the conflict. Widespread
disorder, before and after the Pope’s encyclical in June 1931, had strained the Church-state
relationship to a breaking point. A few bishops and priests publicly protested the regime and
Catholics took part in a war of words through slogans and the handing out of leaflets.106 The
Pope had stood strong on the issue of Catholic lay activity; however, he knew that a majority of
the Cardinals of the Church did not desire a complete break with Italy. He also felt it necessary
to remain in a relationship with the regime to protect the Church's interests in the state.107
Mussolini, too, wanted an end to the discord as it had become a threat to the stability of his
regime. The waves of violence by Fascist youth threatened the authority of the prefects of the
Fascist Party and demonstrated the weakness of the state in keeping Fascist youth in line with
party goals.108 Thus, on September 2, 1931 an agreement was signed to end the conflict. The
agreement presented Mussolini with some positive results. It banned former Italian Popular Party
members from Catholic Action. Moreover, a new structure for Catholic Action was instituted
that made the organization more localized and thereby weakened its national influence.
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However, Catholic Action was not irrevocably weakened by this agreement. Rather, it was able
to exert more influence on the state by welcoming localized organizational activity.109
Additionally, Catholic Action’s right to organize was reinstated. After this conflict, there was
never another attempt to dissolve Catholic lay activity.110 Thus, the reconciliation of the Fascist
state and the Vatican allowed for the continuation of the Church’s efforts at re-Christianization
by reinstating the Catholic influence on Italian society and allowing the Vatican’s efforts to
transform Italy into an ideal Catholic state to continue.111
Despite this conflict, there is debate about the significance of Catholic resistance in 1931.
Historian David I. Kertzer, in his book The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI
and the Rise of Fascism in Europe, argues that the 1931 conflict over Catholic Action was not a
"papal struggle against Fascism." Rather, to Kertzer, the Pope needed Fascist Italy as an ally for
Catholic Action to succeed.112 Kertzer is correct in his assessment that the relationship between
Fascist Italy and the Catholic Church was mutually beneficial. The Lateran Treaties had positive
aspects for both parties. Mussolini’s state gained the recognition of the Church and the Church’s
place in society became sanctioned by the state.113 However, the relationship was more complex
than the simple cooperative arrangement Kertzer implies. The securing of independence for
Catholic Action allowed Pope Pius XI to use the state to his advantage. For example, the Church
battled against immorality by pushing the Italian police to work against female immodesty, such
as women baring their skin on beaches.114 However, Pius XI’s focus on female immodesty is
important when one considers that the Church hierarchy was specifically interested in
influencing female youth due to the ways in which modern society singularly affected them and
their sense of morality.115 Thus, while the Church allied with the Fascist regime in its push to
fight female immodesty the reasoning for the Vatican’s interest in female youth tied back to the
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institution’s desire to impart a Catholic worldview on Italian citizens. It is true that the Church
saw an authoritarian ally as a way to further its influence on society, however, they were not to
be subordinate to that ally.116 While Pope Pius XI found it reasonable to work with Mussolini to
combat female immorality and thus influence feminine modesty, the regime’s efforts to limit the
Church’s lay activity in 1931 were unacceptable. This is seen in Pius XI’s direct response to the
conflict in the encyclical Non Abbiamo Bisogno and his criticism of the state’s desire for a
monopoly over youth to the detriment of the Church.117 Thus, while the Church did work with
and see benefits in a relationship with Fascist Italy, the 1931 conflict signified that the Church
was capable of fighting to preserve its right to influence its followers and thus, in this way, it
fought against Fascism in Italy.
In Germany, the instability of the Reich Concordat led to direct conflict over youth just
days after the agreement was signed. On July 29, 1933 Baldur von Schirach, the head of the
Hitler Youth, forbade Hitler Youth members from also being members of confessional youth
organizations. This decision put Catholic youth members at a disadvantage as being a member of
the Hitler Youth was essential to successfully securing future employment.118 However,
Schirach’s decree on double membership was just the beginning of the strain put upon Catholic
youth groups after the signing of the Reich Concordat. Unlike in Italy, due to the minority status
of the Catholic Church in Germany, the Nazis were able to craft a more coercive policy against
the institution and thus greater oppose the Church’s aims. Nevertheless, as seen with the issue of
the Saarland, the state still had to mold its policies based on national and international
conditions. In order to accommodate these compounding factors, the Nazis attempted to wrest
control from the Church through a campaign for the ideological minds of German youth, rather
than a direct attack on the Vatican itself.119
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The opinion of the Nazi intelligence agency, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), was that Catholic
groups should be limited to religious instruction only, with no influence on politics and this
belief was reinforced by the Reich Concordat. The SD therefore moved against specific priests
known to oppose the regime or have political ambitions.120 This focus on political threats was
followed by a more blatant attack on Catholic lay activity when, in September 1933, the
Bavarian state police prohibited all youth groups, except those that were religious in nature.
Despite the protection of religious groups within this decree, the decision still threatened the
existence of Catholic youth groups in the area. This was because the prohibition, like Article 31
of the Reich Concordat, was unclear in which groups were protected due to their religious nature.
In this way, the decree could be molded to justify action against Catholic youth groups.121 This
thereby highlighted the instability of the Reich Concordat’s stipulations regarding Catholic youth
and thus the Church’s the ability to defend itself against threatening Nazi policies. Tensions
between Church and state increased to such a degree that it became necessary to outline the
meaning of Article 31 in reference to Catholic youth groups. On October 10, 1933
representatives of the Hitler Youth and Catholic youth met to discuss Article 31. What came
from this meeting was not an agreement, but a hope by the Church that the state would protect
the rights of its youth groups.122 However, as these talks went on without a resolution, Nazi
aggression and Catholic resistance both increased.
The first sign that the Nazis would strongly increase pressure on Catholic youth came on
December 19, 1933, when Ludwig Müller, the primate of the German Evangelical Church
(which included a majority of German Protestants) made a deal with the Hitler Youth. This
agreement stipulated that youth could only remain members of the Evangelical Youth of
Germany (Evangelische Jugend Deutschlands) if they were also members of the Hitler Youth.

24
Thus, through this agreement, all Evangelical youth groups were incorporated into the Hitler
Youth.123 The result of this was that the Catholic Church became the last major holdout to Nazi
influence. This gave the state the impetus needed to intensify its pressure on Catholic youth
groups.124
Nevertheless, Catholic youth leaders wanted a clearer recognition by the state of the
Church’s right to shape their young. They desired the ability for young Catholics who were
members of the Hitler Youth to fulfill their religious obligations. The leaders also believed that
Church activities beyond religious instruction like camping and scouting would facilitate a social
consciousness in their followers. On Easter 1934, the Vatican supported the beliefs of Catholic
youth leaders in Germany through a letter.125 Pope Pius XI wrote of his recognition of the
precarious position of Catholic youth in Germany and extended the Vatican’s support to their
cause. The Pope’s message was read throughout Germany at church services and posted on
church doors. The support of the Vatican was inspiring to Catholic youth. This was demonstrated
when, a few weeks after the Pope’s Easter letter, German youth leaders made a pilgrimage to
Rome to pledge the loyalty of all Catholic youth to the Vatican.126 Additionally, 1934 saw an
increase in Catholic mobilization in the face of increasingly aggressive Nazi policies.127 This rise
in mobilization happened specifically through demonstrations in West Germany, the largest of
which was in Essen where thirty-thousand men and boys showed up to demonstrate support.128
Participating in demonstrations during 1933 through 1936 became a common pastime for the
average Catholic youth member, with popular Catholic holidays marking the biggest days of
demonstration.129
After police action that banned the flying of the flags of Church lay organizations except
in churches or on church grounds as well as non-traditional processions, resistance by Catholic
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lay activity molded to Nazi policies. Instead of direct demonstrations, previously small
traditional feasts were celebrated on a large scale. The May 15, 1934 Feast of the Ascension in
Aachen brought forty-thousand young pilgrims to the town.130 Additionally, between June 17
and July 1, 1934, during the 1125th anniversary of the death of the missionary St. Ludger,
twenty-thousand Catholic workers, two-thousand clerical workers, and fifty to sixty-thousand
Catholic boys arrived in the town of Werden.131 This response made the SD see Catholic Action
and Catholic youth groups without evidence as a "coordinating agency" for youth and worker
mobilization. The SD plan to tackle this threat was to dissolve the central office of the JMV and
occupational youth organizations. The Church would be allowed to retain organizations based on
age and sex, but only those with religious aims. However, the goals of the SD took time to
implement, with the Central Office of Catholic Action in Germany not being dissolved until
1938 and the JMV not until 1939. Nevertheless, the intelligence agency realized more state
coercion was necessary in order to cease Catholic influence on youth.132
A change in policy came after the conclusion of the Saar vote in January 1935. The Nazis
no longer needed to worry about negatively affecting Catholic opinion in the area and were free
to use the more coercive powers of the state against Catholic citizens. In line with a broader drive
to secularize public life, the state campaigned in Munich to enroll students in
interdenominational schools. The result of this was a fifty percent decline in Catholic
confessional schools by 1938.133 The police also played a role in coercing members of Catholic
youth. They often arrived too late to help in the case of violence perpetrated by the Hitler Youth
and arrested Catholic youth members for self-defense.134 Furthermore, propaganda campaigns in
1935 portrayed Catholic youth as a location of Communist sympathies and repressive actions
were undertaken against the JMV, with the offices of the JMV in Dusseldorf being closed by the
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secret police.135 At the beginning of 1936 there was a campaign to enroll every ten-year-old girl
and boy in the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls, and by April 19 of that year the
campaign had come close to completely succeeding in its mission.136 The final blow to the
lifeblood of Catholic youth groups came on December 1, 1936 with the Hitler Youth Law. This
law made membership in the Hitler Youth compulsory for all German youth and began a drive
by the state against Catholic youth.137 On July 27, 1937, the state dissolved the JMV within the
diocese of Paderborn. On October 27, 1937 the JMV of Münster was dissolved and on February
1, 1938, the JMV in Cologne and Aachen. By 1938, the JMV had only one-tenth of its original
membership and on February 6, 1939 the Gestapo, or the Nazi secret police force, dissolved it in
its entirety and confiscated its goods.138 By 1939, after dissolving individual groups throughout
Germany, all Catholic youth groups were entirely disbanded.139
Consequently, Catholic youth groups in Germany faced coercive Nazi policies that
threatened their influence and existence and by the beginning of World War II was completely
dissolved at the organizational level. The force with which Catholic youth were disbanded
demonstrated to Pope Pius XI that Hitler’s Nazi regime was not the ideal partner for a new
Catholic state, but rather an authoritative force that would make the Church subservient to its
regime. Consequently, the Pope spoke out against Nazism in the encyclical Mit brennender
Sorge in March 1937.140 The Pope wrote, “What We object to, and what We must object to, is
the intentional and systematically fomented opposition which is set up between these educational
purposes and those of religion.” Pope Pius XI rejected the coercive Nazi policy against
Catholicism. Its attempts to keep Catholic youth from practicing and learning their faith were
antithetical to the Church’s goals.141 Thus, what the Nazi regime undertook in relation to its
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policy with the Catholic Church stood directly against the Church’s desire to sustain its
traditional power and influence over youth in Germany.
The simple facts of the results of the Nazis’ aggressive and coercive policies seem to
point to the successful undermining of the Catholic Church’s traditional power. However, while
the Nazis ultimately dissolved Catholic youth as an organization, its influence remained strong.
Catholic youth groups had excellent leadership and the ability to be flexible in the face of
opposition.142 This flexibility allowed Catholics to adapt to Nazi policies. The response of
Catholic lay members and youth through the mass attendance at traditional feasts before the
Hitler Youth Law of 1936 is an example of this. The meetings were astounding in numbers and
exhibited Catholic lay activity adapting to a Nazi policy that forbade non-traditional
processions.143 Furthermore, after the Hitler Youth Law of 1936, the Nazis worked to usurp
Church authority by drafting youth into the Labor Service. During this service youth worked
away from home for extended periods of time doing agricultural work. This distance created a
challenge for youth in sustaining a strong relationship with the Church.144 To combat these
negative consequences to the Catholic milieu, priests attempted to prepare their followers for the
anti-religious rhetoric they might receive and worked to keep in touch with their long distance
youth.145 Even after the dissolution of Catholic youth groups, the Church worked within the
confines of Nazi law to maintain their influence over youth. Church policy shifted from the now
defunct youth group model to a new policy focused on community religious activities.146 The
influence of this policy did not reach all Catholic youth and was limited to a devoted core made
mostly of girls and rural youth. Young women and rural youth were more easily influenced as
they tended to remain in the home, and thus the community, for greater periods of time than boys
or children who lived in more industrialized areas. Nevertheless, the Church’s adaptive nature
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exemplified its strength and flexibility as well as the ways in which it worked to maintain its
traditional power in order to develop a Catholic worldview in youth.147
Also important in demonstrating the reality of the Nazis’ policy against the Church is an
examination of the weaknesses within Catholic youth’s main competitor for the minds of young
men, the state’s own youth group. The focus of the Hitler Youth was on military training. The
organization’s favoriting of military drills over ideology meant that the Hitler Youth lacked a
strong ideological education. This resulted in leaders that could follow orders but had insufficient
training to adequately convey ideas.148 In this way, the political indoctrination within the Hitler
Youth was weak.149 Moreover, the pressure and anti-Catholicism of the organization pushed
many Catholics away from the ideals of the group.150 Thus, Catholic youth made up the largest
group of holdouts from the Hitler Youth, and many were not persuaded to join even when it
became compulsory after 1936.151 What added to this was the late implementation of the Hitler
Youth Law. While it was announced in 1936, the Hitler Youth knew it was not ready for the kind
of coordination needed for mass compulsory involvement.152 Therefore, it was not until
executive orders in March, April, and November 1939 that the order was carried out.153
Furthermore, the coming of the war highlighted Nazi weaknesses. As youth leaders were
drafted into the war, their organizations were left vulnerable and the same thing happened to
Nazi Party leadership.154 By January 1941, ninety-five percent of those in the highest positions in
Nazi youth leadership were at the front, rather than coordinating indoctrination at home.155 Due
to this lack of leadership, the Hitler Youth was nonexistent in some areas of Germany.156
Moreover, the distractions of war created an opening for Catholic influence, particularly through
the actions of priests. The war also weakened the enforcement of Nazi policies and gave Catholic
influence room to breathe.157 Consequently, despite Nazi coercion and the dissolution of Catholic
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youth groups, the flexibility of Catholic youth leaders and the weaknesses of the Hitler Youth
meant that the Church was still able to play a role in influencing the youth of the regime and thus
retain aspects of its traditional power.
In Italy, after 1931, there was never an attempt by the Fascist regime to dissolve Catholic
lay activity.158 However, Catholic Action was under the watchful eye of the state and was closely
monitored by Fascist police. The influence of Catholic Action on its members was also used by
the regime to direct the political action of Catholics. For example, in 1934, Catholic Action
instructed its members to vote for Mussolini's government.159 As the decade ended, however,
tension increased in the relationship between Church and state. During the late 1930s, from the
Ethiopian War to the beginning of World War II, the Fascist Party attempted to increase its hold
on the populace. Sanctions by the League of Nations that resulted from Italy’s war in Ethiopia
meant that Italy faced economic and social hardship. Thus, Mussolini found it necessary to spur
a new sense of dynamism in the populace. To do so, he relied on techniques to increase the
Fascist Party’s influence on society. The regime expanded its anti-Bolshevik and anti-bourgeois
propaganda campaigns, instituted the passo romano (goose step), and through new laws
increased the Party’s involvement in corporatism, unions, and youth organizations.160 In October
1937 all youth organization came under the control of the Fascist Party rather than remain under
the state Ministry of Education. The Italian Youth of the Lictor (Gioventu Italiana del Littorio,
GIL) was created, and by February 1939 membership was obligatory.161 The organization was
named after the lictors of Ancient Rome who served the elite and bore the fasces, a symbol of
authority in their society.162 The naming of this organization after the lictors, and thus connecting
it to a symbol of authority that was now used by the Fascists in Italy, was a further attempt to
reinvigorate the Fascist movement. The creation of the organization was also an attempt to give
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the Party a greater influence on the indoctrination of youth by having youth organizations under
direct control of the Fascist Party.163
As Mussolini’s tactics became increasingly intrusive, they began to alarm Pope Pius XI.
This happened at the same time that Mussolini’s fear of the power of Catholic Action grew
stronger.164 Due to the reaches of Mussolini domestically and abroad, attention had been drawn
to cracks in the Fascist regime that Catholic lay activity was able to fill. This increased
Mussolini’s anxiety regarding Catholic institutions. Historian Alexander J. De Grand, in his
article, "Cracks in the Facade: The Failure of Fascist Totalitarianism in Italy, 1935-9,” sees
Italian Fascism as a failed endeavor and the period of 1935 through 1940 as one of crisis for the
regime. By this time Mussolini had become increasingly reliant on traditional forces to make his
state run and to carry out his foreign and domestic vision. Conservative industrial elites were the
basis for Italy’s system of corporatism, while his relationship with the Church supplied public
support and influence.165
What commenced during the last two years of the decade was almost a repeat of the
conflict of 1931. During the late 1930s Catholic Action increased its efforts in lay activity. As in
previous years, in 1938, the result of this move was an escalation in tension between the regime
and the Church and a consequent attempt by the state to control Catholic lay activity. However,
this time, Mussolini’s state was not as strong as it had been in 1931. The war in Ethiopia and
Italy’s participation in the Spanish Civil War had led to inflation by 1938. This, coupled with
sanctions by the League of Nations, meant that Italy faced an economic crisis.166 As soldiers
returned home from the front they found it difficult to find the jobs they had been promised upon
taking up arms.167 This made 1939 a time of increased labor agitation.168 Thus, there was a rising
feeling of distance between Fascist administrators and the average citizen and people started to
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see those administrators as corrupt and self-serving.169 Italian citizens began to desert Fascist
meetings and rip down Fascist badges.170 Overall, uncertainty about the survival of the regime
was a common feeling.171
Compounding these problems was the increased activities of Catholic Action, the
Catholic University Federation, and the movement of Catholic graduates, whose voices had
become a kind of “alternative political class.” The strength of the Catholic organizational
structure and its consequent influence on the public threatened Mussolini, especially with a
weakened state. Thus, in January 1939, as in 1931, Mussolini accused the Vatican of harboring
secret aspirations to return to political work through Catholic Action.172 However, Mussolini’ s
threats were less successful the second time and the cracks in his regime only expanded.
Once the war began, like in Germany, the regime was faced with the problem of a youth
leader shortage when many of the leaders headed to the front lines. What resulted were leaders
who were younger and less well trained than those who had come before, which meant
imperfections in indoctrination that threatened the regime’s ideological stability.173 Furthermore,
during times of wartime stress individuals turned to the Church for guidance instead of the
ideology of the state. This resulted in an increase in the importance of the Catholic Church in the
eyes of the average citizen.174 By August 1943, just before the fall of Mussolini, Catholic bishops
felt they had enough power to urge Mussolini’s government to let the Church directly run the
youth organization.175 Thus, the war demonstrated that the complete control Mussolini desired
over his populace was not a reality. The power retained by the Church through the Lateran
Treaties, and through Mussolini’s dependence on traditional forces, allowed the Church to take
advantage of the cracks in the Fascist regime and continue to influence youth in a way that
demonstrated the resilience of the Church to Mussolini’s Fascist state.
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Although Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were two states with different legacies
regarding the place of the Catholic Church in society, both states came into conflict with the
Church over the issue of youth groups. Youth became a focal point of discord due to their
importance in the fulfillment of the fascist states’ objective of a new generation for a new society
as well as in the Church’s desire for a re-Christianized society. The conflict played out
differently in both states, with the Church retaining more power in Italian society. Nevertheless,
the basis of the conflict, and the desire of the Catholic Church to retain its traditional power over
youth, was the same in both states. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany made inroads against Church
influence over youth, being more overtly successful in Germany. However, the Church resisted
coercion by the state in both countries. Ultimately, it was the insistence of the Church to its
influence over Catholic youth that proved a threat to the fulfillment of the fascist vision for
society. While the Church in both states had to maneuver within frameworks of influence,
ultimately it was able to retain aspects of its traditional power and worldview in both states that
demonstrated its resilience to fascist attempts to remake society.
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